ENAV considers the operational safety level of air navigation services an essential priority. In pursuing its institutional objectives, it reconciles the interdependencies of the different performance areas with the achievement of the paramount objectives of safety.

The safety processes defined are mainly intended to prevent air safety incidents and accidents, especially those involving the direct/indirect contribution of ATMs, by correcting and controlling the conditions leading up to unwanted events and by reducing the risk factors so as to achieve and maintain an acceptable level of risk exposure.

ENAV considers the operational safety level of air navigation services an essential priority. In pursuing its institutional objectives, it reconciles the interdependencies of the different performance areas with the achievement of the paramount objectives of safety.

Safety policy

The Safety Policy is the ENAV Group’s formal statement regarding the high priority it gives to the level of operational safety of air navigation services.

It is this policy to which the ENAV Group requires the commitment of all its personnel, starting from its management, for the implementation of transparent and responsible actions in the field of safety.

This policy is also the official act that mandated the establishment of a Safety Management System which, in compliance with the applicable laws and best practices in the sector, serves as a fundamental tool in the proactive and systematic management of safety.

Just culture policy

The Just Culture Policy approved by the Group’s senior management is a further evidence of the priority the Group places on safety. This policy states that human resources are fundamental to ensure the safe management of air traffic and that its skills are the best answer to unforeseen and unforeseeable situations. For this reason, ENAV accepts that an honest error, even when associated with an unintended consequence, should not be sanctioned if connected to human fallibility or when committed honestly.

The policy also states that failure to report an event that jeopardises or may jeopardise safety is unacceptable, and wilful violations and gross negligence that lower the level of safety and/or increase the level of risk will not be tolerated and will be punished.

The active participation of personnel is a critical factor in the successful and effective implementation of the Safety Management System. As a result,  ENAV fosters a climate of trust and of information sharing and encourages the reporting of facts and information that are useful in preventing aeronautical incidents and accidents.

In this context, the Just Culture Policy is a fundamental and enabling element of the occurrence reporting system, implemented pursuant to international standards and current regulations, adopting the “no blame” approach.1

Safety management system

ENAV has implemented the “common requirements” for the provision of air navigation services established with the context of the Single European Sky.
It also has its own Safety Management Manual (SMM) which complies with all the requirements contained in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 1035/2011.

In accordance with EASA Decision 2013/032/R on the Implementation and Measurement of Safety Key Performance Indicators, specifically the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and the Guidance Material (GM),
the effectiveness of ENAV’s Safety Management System is measured and validated by ENAC on an annual basis.

Given the importance of the Safety Management System, the effectiveness of safety management (EoSM) is one of the most important indicators in the performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions, established pursuant to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 390/2013. As specified in the regulation, “the performance scheme should provide for indicators and binding targets in all key performance areas with required safety levels fully achieved and maintained.” For this reason, the effectiveness of the Safety Management System is measured by means of an assessment process in which the European Commission and the Performance Review Body are assisted by EASA.

Management Objectives

The EoSM assessment process is based on the Eurocontrol Safety Framework Maturity Survey (SFMS) and assess the level of implementation and maturity of 5 management objectives.

The EoSM assessment process is based on the Eurocontrol Safety Framework Maturity Survey (SFMS) and assess the level of implementation and maturity of 5 management objectives.
The management objectives linked to the targets provided for by the performance scheme for air navigation services are associated with the management objectives (MO). Specifically, on an ascending scale ranging from Level A to Level E, the expected
objectives are as follows:

  1.  MO “Safety Policy and Objectives”, Level D;
  2. MO “Safety Risk Management”, Level D;
  3. MO “Safety Assurance”, Level D;
  4. MO “Safety Promotion”,  Level D;
  5.  MO “Safety Culture”, Level C.

Continuous safety monitoring

Safety monitoring is one of the essential activities of the Safety Management System. The measurement of specific indicators makes it possible to have updated information on the state of safety and allows for the timely identification of possible measures to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
The state of safety within the various organisational structures is further assessed through safety surveys, i.e. specific assessment activities carried out by the safety division.

The main safety activities

The number of company activities and projects related to safety is of undoubted importance. This is also due to the fact that the activities aimed at improving services, i.e. those regarding environmental sustainability and improving ENAV’s economic efficiency (respectively addressed in the essential performance areas of Capacity, the Environment and Cost-Efficiency) are closely related to the essential performance area of safety.
It is now established practice that investment programs that intend to make the most of technological innovations, the modernisation of the ATM/CNS and MET infrastructures, the review of the selection, recruitment, use and verification processes of personnel, as well as changes in organisational and production processes, must take into account the aspects and, above all, the pre-eminent objectives of safety.
In order to provide some quantitative and qualitative evidence, we would like to note that in relation to plans, modifications and/or activities related to the supply of air navigation services deriving from the business plan, from the European convergence plan (LSSIP), from the need to maintain and modernise the technological infrastructures (rather than from the reorganisation of the delivery methods for operational services and the optimisation of configurations and layouts), in 2018, in accordance with
the SMS_P07 procedure ‘Safety assessment of changes to the ATM/ANS functional system and to the training activities’ of the Safety Management System, the following activities were carried out:

126.031

of  unit training2

1.729

participants

64.965

hours
of continuation training3

1.890

around participants

TypeOperationsTechnologyOthersTotalChange
2018-2017%
Modifications52661533+231%
Mirror simplified changes632131646+162%
Minor changes1811029+38%
Major changes10010%
Total1,1773021,209+181%

The following activities highlight the transversal nature of safety with respect to the business activities as a whole:

  • activities in the context of FAB BLUE MED: participation in the Safety Aspect Working Group, established under the auspices of the ANSP Committee of BLUE MED FAB;
  • technical roundtables at international organisations;
  • cooperation and coordination with airport operators;
  • cooperation with other Air Navigation Service Providers;
  • cooperation with the airlines;
  •  membership and cooperation with CANSO;
  •  memoranda of understanding and agreements with the National Agency for Flight Safety and the Flight Safety Inspector of the Italian Air Force;
  • membership in the Italian Flight Safety Committee (IFSC);
  • participation in promotional and informative events on aeronautics, with Aero Club d’Italia (AeCI), Volare Sicuri, Centro Studi STASA, ANACNA, ERMin, ISAERS, Comando delle Capitanerie di Porto and with national and international academic organisations;
  • the provision of specialised training.

The “no blame” approach is the non-punitive approach associated with the Just Culture Policy adopted in accordance with Regulation (EU) No. 376/2014. It refers to the manner in which the organisation manages mistakes and sanctions. In contrast to the “blame culture,” the “no blame” approach and the adoption of the principles of the Just Culture Policy support the reporting culture by opting not to punish honest mistakes and by elevating the analysis of individual behaviours to an analysis of systemic and/or organisational fallibility, therefore restricting the scope of sanctionable acts to cases of unacceptable behaviour (i.e. acts that are intentional, malicious and illegal that aim to reduce the level of safety).
The Unit Training refers to the fact that each air traffic controller, in order to be able to exercise license privileges at a specific area facility, must train and reach a minimum level of theoretical and technical knowledge that allows the controller to operate independently in the operational position for which the controller is trained.
3 Refers to continuing professional education aimed at maintaining the skills of all the air traffic controllers employed in the operational line as well as the FISO (Flight Information Service Officer) employed at the AFIUs (Airdrome Flight Information Unit) or at the FICs (Flight Information Centre) of the ACCs (Air Control Centre).